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Transparency and View Regarding Nuclear Energy Before 
and After the Fukushima Accident: Evidence on Micro-data  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the influence of government transparency on changing views 
regarding nuclear energy before and after Japan’s natural and nuclear disaster of 2011. Individual 
level data were used, covering 45 countries and containing 27,423 observations. It was observed in 
the majority of countries that the rate of favoring nuclear energy declined after the disaster. However, 
empirical results show that such a tendency is less likely to be observed in a more transparent 
country. This implies that views regarding nuclear energy were less elastic to the news of the 
Fukushima incident when people were more certain about nuclear energy prior to the Fukushima 
incident. 
 
JEL classification: D73, D82, H12, Q54  
Key words: Nuclear energy, persuasion, information, transparency, learning, Fukushima accident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On March 11, 2011, one of the worst natural disasters in modern times hit Japan—a 
devastating earthquake accompanied by a tsunami. As a consequence, a number of serious accidents 
occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, resulting in nuclear leakage. This 
combination of disasters caused tremendous damage to the Japanese economy. Furthermore, 
economic globalization meant that the effects of the disaster were felt worldwide. In terms of the 
political consequences, approximately two weeks after the disaster, with nuclear energy becoming a 
hotly debated international topic, a German political party that opposed nuclear energy won their 
state election (Baden-Wurttemberg state). This result would indicate that Japan’s nuclear disaster has 
influenced views regarding nuclear energy in countries some distance from Japan. 
A growing number of researchers are investigating the outcomes of natural disasters (e.g., 
Skidmore and Toya 2002; Toya and Skidmore 2007; Yamamura 2010). Existing literature has shown 
that democratic nations and those with effective governments suffer less damage from natural 
disasters compared with other countries. (Kahn 2005; Escaleras et al., 2007). Eisensee and 
Stromberg (2007) have stated that information obtained through the news media can play a critical 
role in disaster relief. Berger (2010) found that in Germany, nuclear incidents such as Chernobyl can 
increase an individual’s concern for the environment. Both democratic institutions and the mass 
media play lead roles in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy (Besley and 
Burgess 2002).
1
 Education and media played significant roles in forming citizens' views regarding 
the events of September 11, 2001 (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2004). The quality and quantity of 
information regarding nuclear energy was important in forming views about nuclear energy after the 
incident on March 11, 2011. Yamamura (2012) examined the role of media and its effect on the 
perceived safety of nuclear energy after the Fukushima accident. 
 Aside from private mass-media firms, the present paper also focuses on the role of 
                                                   
1 Government transparency contributes to increasing economic efficiency (Alt and Lassen 
2006; Bruns and Himmler 2011). 
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government in providing sufficient information regarding nuclear energy to enable the public to form 
opinions. The Fukushima incident is considered to be a natural experiment to examine how an 
unpredicted event can change the views of citizens and the extent to which that influence depends on 
institution. The persuasion approach offers a useful framework with which to consider the role of 
government in providing information about nuclear energy (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010). 
According to the belief-based model of persuasion (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010), people would 
be less likely to be affected by news of the Fukushima incident if government had already provided 
sufficient information regarding nuclear energy. Islam (2006) developed an indicator that measures 
the frequency with which governments update data to be released to the public. The indicator is 
considered to represent government transparency (Islam 2006). Individual level data regarding views 
on nuclear energy before and after the Fukushima incident in each county were sourced from 
WIN-Gallup International. This paper used the data, which consist of 27,423 observations, to 
investigate the effect of prior information provided by government on any changes in the views of 
citizens regarding nuclear energy before and after the Fukushima incident. The key finding is that 
people were less likely to be affected by the Fukushima incident if they had received more frequent 
government updates, although the share of people favoring nuclear energy declined after the disaster 
in the majority of countries. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the simple empirical 
model and the study’s hypotheses are proposed. Data and regression equations are presented in 
Section 3. Section 4 provides the estimation results and their interpretation. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Simple Model and Hypothesis 
 
To describe the empirical model in a simplistic form, I used a persuasion model framework. 
As shown by DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010), persuasion models are generally divided into two 
categories: belief-based models (Stigler 1961, Telser 1964) and preference-based models (Stigler 
and Becker 1977; Becker and Murphy 1993). In a belief-based model, which is largely based on 
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Bayesian theory, the weaker the priors of the individuals who receive additional information, the 
greater the influence that the information will have on their beliefs. To put it differently, new 
information has a weak influence on the attitudes and behaviors of individuals who are close to 
certain about the state ex ante.  
The effects of receiving prior information are often examined in the domain of political 
persuasion (Prior 2006; Enikolopov et al. 2009). On this topic, Zaller (1992) found that the 
Iran-Contra affair did not change individuals’ views regarding Ronald Reagan, partly because 
individuals had prior knowledge of his performance. The frequency with which governments update 
data to be released to the public can be considered the degree of prior knowledge regarding nuclear 
energy. When the Fukushima incident occurred, citizens received new information regarding nuclear 
energy via various media sources, such as the Internet. The use of a belief-based framework model 
would be appropriate to analyze the subject matter of this study. Hence, in a manner similar to 
previous works of political persuasion, this paper attempts to explore the impact of the Fukushima 
incident on the views of individuals regarding nuclear energy. A simple empirical model would 
assume: 
 
VIEW(0) = α0 +α1 NETBEN(0) + e,     (1) 
 
where VIEW(0) are those favoring nuclear power after the incident and NETBEN(0) is the perceived 
net benefits of nuclear power after the incident. The variable NETBEN(0) also incorporates the 
perceived risk of a nuclear accident. The error term is denoted by e. We would expect α1> 0, i.e., 
higher perceived net-benefits imply that more people favor nuclear power. In addition:  
 
NETBEN(0) = NETBEN(–1) + DNETBEN,     (2) 
 
where NETBEN(–1) is the perceived net-benefits prior to the incident and dnetben is the perceived 
change in netben after the incident, i.e., DNETBEN = NETBEN(0) – NETBEN(–1). Note that the 
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variables NETBEN(I) and DNETBEN are unobservable. We can use VIEW(–1) as a proxy for 
NETBEN(–1) under the assumption that: 
 
NETBEN(–1) = β0 +β1VIEW(–1) + u,     (3) 
 
where β1> 0. The error term is denoted by u. Furthermore, under additional informational 
assumptions discussed below, we can also assume that TRANS, which captures the degree of 
government transparency, affects DNETBEN: 
 
DNETBEN = η0+η1TRANS + w.     (4) 
 
As will be discussed below, it is unclear what sign to expect for η1. w is error term. However, 
substituting (2)–(4) into (1) and subtracting VIEW (–1) on both sides, we get our estimated equation: 
VIEW(0) – VIEW(–1) = α0 + α1β1 + η0+ (α1β1-1)VIEW(–1) + η1 TRANS + α1u + w.     (5) 
 
To obtain consistent estimates, however, w and u should be uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables used in (5).  
This equation can be rewritten as the following equation (6): 
VIEW(0) – VIEW(–1) = γ0 +γ1VIEW(–1) +γ2 TRANS + r.     (6) 
 
The error term is denoted by r. In addition to the assumptions (α1 > 0, β1 > 0) previously mentioned, 
if magnitudes of α1 and β1 are sufficiently large, then α1β1 > 1. This leads me to expect that the sign 
of γ1 is positive in equation (6). In contrast, if magnitudes ofα1 and β1 are not sufficiently large, then 
α1β1 < 1. Hence, it is expected that the sign of γ1 is negative in equation (6). The empirical question 
here is whether the sign of γ1 becomes positive or negative.  
As previously mentioned, I believe that we can learn more about (4) and (5) by adding 
further informational structure to the model. To illustrate, let Q be a variable on the [0,1]-interval 
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representing the degree of transparency, where Q = 1 is fully transparent and Q = 0 is entirely 
non-transparent (e.g., North Korea). Then, Q can be interpreted as the amount of information that 
passes through to the public. Moreover, let C* be the expected costs of nuclear power under full 
information (in the following, we ignore benefits that we assume will not be affected by the disaster). 
Peoples' perceptions of the cost prior to the tsunami could then be represented as: 
 
C(–1) = Q C*.     (7) 
 
Thus, entirely transparent countries (Q = 1) correctly perceive C(–1) = C*, whereas non-transparent 
countries (Q = 0) perceive C(–1) = 0. Next, we consider what happens after the disaster, 
distinguishing between three cases.  
 
CASE 1: All information is revealed 
 
This case assumes that the “full information” cost, C*, does not change after the disaster. However, 
it is assumed that the public in all countries can now observe the actual potential costs of nuclear 
power. That is, regardless of transparency, people can obtain accurate information regarding the 
nuclear incident after the incident occurs. The emergence and development of cross-border media 
enable people to obtain the information, even in less transparent countries. The supply of 
information regarding nuclear energy is drastically increased when the incident takes place. Hence, 
the amount of information obtained by people via the media, for example, using the Internet, is 
greater after the incident than before. Hence, before the accident, the information obtained is 
considered to largely depend on the degree of transparency. This assumption is considered to reflect 
the real situation in 2011, where the Internet is widely available worldwide.   
 
C(0) – C(–1) = C* – Q C* = C* (1–Q). 
 
 7 
 
Notice that the perceived costs increase in all countries (except those that are fully transparent), but 
more so in the non-transparent countries. Thus, the change in the perceived costs of nuclear power is 
negatively related to transparency. In terms of equations (4) and (5), this implies that η1>0 and γ2>0.  
From this, I propose Hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Attitudes toward nuclear energy change less in more transparent countries even after the occurrence 
of a nuclear accident. 
 
CASE 2: Shock to cost and imperfect pass-through 
 
This case assumes that the disaster resulted in a general shock, w, to the “full information” cost of 
nuclear power, i.e., costs increase to C* + w. However, a lack of transparency implies that this is not 
fully revealed in all countries. In contrast to CASE 1, cross-border media have not been well 
developed and people are unable to obtain information via cross-border media. Therefore, 
transparency of country is considered to influence the circulation of information after the incident 
occurs. Thus:  
 
C(0) – C(–1) = Q (C* + w) – Q C* = Q w. 
 
This means that perceived costs increase in all countries, but in contrast to CASE 1 the change is 
greater in more transparent societies. Thus, the change in the perceived costs of nuclear power is 
positively related to transparency. In terms of equations (4) and (5), this implies that η1<0 and γ2<0. 
Thus, Hypothesis 2 is postulated as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2: 
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Attitudes toward nuclear energy change more in more transparent countries after the occurrence of 
a nuclear accident. 
 
CASE 3: Shock to cost and perfect pass-through of shock 
 
This case is similar to CASE 2, but it is now assumed that the shock—and only the shock—is fully 
observed in all countries. In this situation, cross-border media have not been sufficiently developed, 
nor are they widespread, although some media are present. Hence, people do receive information 
regarding the shock, but not regarding nuclear energy.  
 
C(0) – C(–1) = Q C* + w – Q C* = w. 
 
Now the perceived cost increases in all countries by the same amount, w. Moreover, transparency 
has no effect on the change, i.e., η1 = γ2 = 0. This leads to Hypothesis 3. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
Attitudes toward nuclear energy are not affected by transparency even after the occurrence of a 
nuclear accident. 
  
3. Data and Specification  
 
In March 2011, approximately two weeks after Japan’s natural disaster, WIN-Gallup 
International (2011) conducted a survey regarding nuclear energy in 47 countries
2
. The 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) provided the individual level 
data used in the analysis in this paper; 27,423 samples were used for the baseline estimations. 
                                                   
2 Serbia and Palestine are included in the survey; however, they are not included in the 
data used in this paper because of a lack of macro economic variables and the transparency 
index used in this paper. Thus, the number of countries is reduced from 47 to 45.  
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The survey contained the following questions: "What was your view about nuclear energy 
prior to the Japan earthquake?" and "What was your view about nuclear energy after the Japan 
earthquake?" Respondents were given four response options: “strongly favor”, “somewhat favor”, 
“somewhat oppose”, or “strongly oppose”. I merged the four groups into two groups: “favor” and 
“oppose”
3
 and calculated any changes in the rate of favoring nuclear energy. These results are 
presented in column (1), Table 1. With the exception of Azerbaijan, Fiji, Morocco, South Africa, and 
Spain, the rates of favoring nuclear energy are represented by a negative value for the surveyed 
countries. These results suggest that the nuclear accident in Japan has made people more cautious 
about nuclear energy. Thus, the accident has had an obvious impact on views regarding nuclear 
energy worldwide. Respondents may, however, not accurately recall what their views on the matter 
were prior to the incident. Furthermore, their post-earthquake views may have been only temporarily 
affected. These possibilities can result in measurement errors, causing a bias known as attenuation 
bias. This generally results in the downward bias of estimates
4
. Individual values of VIEW(0) and 
VIEW(–1) range between 1 (strongly oppose ) and 4 (strongly favor). As shown in Table 2, mean 
values for VIEW(0) and VIEW(–1) are 2.72 and 2.56, respectively. Their standard deviations are 
both 1.06, which is not considered large. However, the mean of DVIEW is –0.15, with a standard 
deviation of 0.74. The standard deviation for DIVIEW is regarded as remarkably large, suggesting a 
measurement error as mentioned above. Therefore, what I estimated in the presence of the 
measurement error is in fact less in magnitude than the true effect. That is, attenuation bias possibly 
occurs in the estimations. If the measurement errors do not vary systematically across the countries, 
then the measurement error does not necessary pose a great problem. 
Even if the measurement error is not great problem, a potential problem with the survey 
design requires a stability check via a comparison with other surveys on nuclear power. GlobeScan 
                                                   
3 The aggregated level results regarding the favoring of nuclear energy before and after the 
natural disaster in each county are available from WIN-Gallup International (2011). It is 
available at http://www.nrc.co.jp/report/pdf/110420_2.pdf (accessed 29 April 2011). 
4 There may also be other biases present. For instance, if there is a temporary downward 
shift in preferences and attitudes that eventually return to their original level, then the 
effect is overestimated and at best only captures the short-term effect. The estimates may be 
biased for this reason. Controlling for this bias is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, 
special care should be called for when interpreting the estimation results. 
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conducted polls concerning nuclear energy in 2005 and between June and September in 2011. 
Respondents were asked whether or not they supported the opinion “Nuclear power is relatively safe 
and an important source of electricity. We should build new plants”. Data are available regarding the 
share of respondents who supported this opinion in each year and the difference between 2005 and 
2011
5
. This information does not suffer from the bias discussed above. The GlobeScan survey has 
been conducted in eight countries (France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States). WIN-Gallup International has also conducted surveys in six of 
those countries.  
In column (2), Table 1, the difference in the share is reported for 6 countries: France, 
Germany, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Negative values are observed for all countries, 
which is in line with column (1) showing data from WIN-Gallup International
6
. A closer 
examination provides a more interesting finding: France has absolute values of 8 in column (1) and 
10 in column (2) and the values for India are 9 in column (1) and 10 in column (2). Thus, the 
difference of the values between the two surveys is 2 and 1 for France and India, respectively. This 
indicates that the results based on the WIN-Gallup International and GlobeScan surveys are similar. 
Therefore, the bias caused by the survey design is not observed for France and India. In contrast, 
Japan has absolute values of 23 in column (1) and 15 in column (2) and for Russia these are 11 in 
column (1) and 3 in column (2). The values for the United States are 6 in column (1) and 1 in 
column (2). These results show that changes of opinions regarding nuclear energy before and after 
the Fukushima accident are much larger in the data from the WIN-Gallup International than the data 
from GlobeScan. This suggests that the measurement error is large for Japan, Russia and the United 
States. These countries all experienced serious nuclear accidents: Fukushima, Chernobyl and Three 
Mile Island. Respondents from Japan were survey by WIN-Gallup International immediately after 
the Fukushima accident, which naturally influenced their responses. As for Russia and the United 
                                                   
5Data available at 
http://www.globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/bbc2011_nuclear_energy/bbc2011_e
nergy.pdf. (Accessed April 5, 2013). 
6 Among the eight countries survey by GlobeScan, a positive value was only observed for the 
United Kingdom; however, it is not reported in Table 1 because the WIN-Gallup survey was 
not conducted in the United Kingdom.  
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States, memories of their respective accidents seem to have caused anxiety and concern among 
respondents and their responses reflect a strong reaction to the Fukushima accident
7
.  
The frequency with which government-update data are available to the public is used to 
represent government transparency (Islam 2006). Therefore, government transparency plays a 
significant role in forming the prior knowledge of citizens. For the 11 representative economic 
variables, Islam (2006) observed the actual frequency level with which the data are published to 
create the index of government transparency. This index is used as the proxy variable for the degree 
of government transparency, TRANS, which appears earlier in the paper in equations (4) and (5) 
(section 2, p. 6). However, non-economic factors are not taken into account in creating the index 
because the index is calculated using economic variables. Thus, non-economic factors, such as 
political issues and whether a Freedom of Information Act (FOI) has been adopted, should be also 
considered when creating the index. That is, “the transparency index indicates how much economic 
information governments are willing to disclose—but the FOI law gives access to more than just 
economic data” (Islam 2006, 131). To this end, Islam (2006) constructed an alternative measure of 
government transparency, TRANS1 and TRANS2. TRANS1 combines TRANS and a dummy for the 
adoption of the FOI. The degree to which the FOI takes root is thought to have different effects and 
depends on the number of years that have passed since it was adopted. Therefore, TRANS2 
combines TRANS and the index of years that have passed since the FOI was adopted. As a 
robustness check on the impact of government transparency (considered as an effect of citizens’ 
prior knowledge), this paper uses TRANS, TRANS1, and TRANS2 as proxies for government 
transparency.  
Definitions and the basic statistics for the variables used in the estimations are presented in 
Table 2. The estimated function takes the following form: 
 
DVIEWij = γ0 + γ1TRANSi (TRANSi1 or TRANSi2) + γ2VIEW(–1)i + γ3EXPEi + γ4CORRUPTi + 
γ5CATHOi + γ6LEGAL_ENi + γ7 LEGAL_FRi + γ8NCLEARi + γ9Ln(POP)i + γ10GDPi + 
                                                   
7 Absolute values for Germany are 8 in column (1) and 15 in column (2), which are in 
contrast to the results of Japan, Russia, and the United States. 
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γ11GOVSIZi + γ12EASIAi + γ13EUROPi + γ14NDISi + Xij  + ui,  
where DVIEW represents a change in degree of favoring nuclear energy before and after the 
natural disaster for individual j in country i, α represents regression parameters, and u is the error 
term. In addition, X represents the vector of the individual characteristics (age, household income 
dummies, level of education dummies, job status dummies, gender dummies, and residential place 
dummies) of the respondent and  is the vector of its regression parameters. As shown in Table 2, 
level of household income is measured by a subjective evaluation and not an objective one because 
an objective measure is not available from the data (although an objective measure is more 
desirable).  
Table 2 also shows the share of each group for each variable as follows: share of those who 
regarded their household income as low (20%, which is the similar to share of those who regarded 
their household income as medium low and medium) and share of those who regarded their 
household income as medium high (14%, which is the same as the share of those who regarded their 
household income as high). Hence, no income group in particular enjoyed a greater share. 
Concerning education level, I was only able to obtain rough categories: (1) no education or basic 
education, (2) secondary school, and (3) a high level of education such as university. The 
percentages of no education or basic education, secondary school, and high level are 25, 43, and 
32%, respectively. Job status can be categorized into 4 groups: (1) retired, (2) full-time worker, (3) 
unemployed, and (4) housewife or student (the largest percentage is that held by full-time worker at 
54%). The percentage of female respondents at 49% is almost the same as that of males at 51%. 
Residential address is categorized as either urban or rural residents. The percentage of urban 
residents is 72%, suggesting that the majority of respondents reside in urban areas. 
The view of nuclear energy before the natural disaster has been included (VIEW(–1)) to 
control for the initial level of favoring nuclear energy. People in countries that have experienced a 
devastating nuclear disaster may be more concerned than those in other countries. Hence, it may be 
appropriate to control for countries such as Russia and the United States (which experienced the 
Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents) to attenuate the bias discussed in the previous section. 
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To this end, I incorporate EXPE, which is a dummy variable for Russia and the United States. In 
addition to TRANS, various institutional factors possibly influence people’s perceptions (Sobel, 
2002; MacCulloch and Pezzini, 2010). For instance, a corrupt government may hide important 
information for the benefit of bureaucrats and politicians at the expense of the rest of society. 
Inevitably, the degree of government corruption influences perceptions (Yamamura, 2011). In 
addition, religion was found to be associated with people’s perceptions in modern economic research 
(e.g., Guiso et al., 2003; Arrunada, 2010; MacCulloch and Pezzini, 2010). Furthermore, it is well 
known that legal origin of country is one of the key determinants of government quality (La Porta et 
al., 1999). If a proxy for legal origin is not included, TRANS correlates with the error term, resulting 
in estimation bias. Hence, CORRUPT, LEGAL_EN, and LEGAL_FR are incorporated as 
independent variables. With the aim of capturing these factors, I incorporated the following 
variables: PROTE (Protestant rate), CATHO (Catholic rate), LEGAL_EN (which is 1 if legal origin 
is French, otherwise 0), and LEGAL_FR (which is 1 if legal origin is French, otherwise 0). As 
nuclear energy plants increase, the likelihood of nuclear accidents also rises. The number of nuclear 
energy plants is included to control for this effect. Economic factors are captured by including 
population, GDP per capital, and government expenditure (% of GDP). These data were sourced 
from the Penn World Table (PWT 6.3)
 8
. There appears to be a negative externality with regard to 
nuclear leakage caused by natural disaster. The possibility of suffering such an externality varies 
with regard to a nation’s distance from Japan. Thus, the location of countries with regard to Japan 
influences changes in views about nuclear energy. Dummies for East Asian countries and European 
countries were incorporated into this model to capture such effects
9
. The experience of natural 
disasters is thought to be related to predictions regarding the outcome of natural disasters and, in turn, 
                                                   
8 The data are available from the Center of International Comparisons at the University of 
Pennsylvania. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (accessed 28 March 2011).  
9 Considering the distance from Japan may be important because the spread of news 
regarding the disaster may take longer to reach more distant countries. However, it is 
difficult to measure distance because distance varies according to the location of the 
geographical point within a country from Japan. This is problematic especially when the 
land size is large. For instance, in the case of the United States, the distance between Los 
Angeles and Tokyo is different to the distance between New York and Tokyo. Therefore, 
instead of distance, regional dummies are incorporated even though these dummies do not 
accurately capture the distance. 
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influence views regarding nuclear power. To capture this effect, the total number of disasters that 
have occurred since 1970 are incorporated in the function. 
It is likely that nuclear plants will exist in the countries where people favor nuclear energy. 
The OLS estimation results above possibly suffer from endogeneity bias because there may be a 
reverse causality between the dependent variable (DVIEW) and independent variable (NCLEAR). If 
people have a more positive view about nuclear energy, plans to build new nuclear plants are more 
likely to be supported. Consequently, the number of nuclear plants increases. Hence, NCLEAR can 
be considered as an endogenous variable. To control for this bias, instrumental variables were used 
to conduct the Limited Maximum Likelihood (LIML) Fuller version estimation. The building of 
nuclear energy plants requires sufficient land area. Furthermore, it is difficult to find the space to 
build plants in more densely populated countries. Therefore, population density and land area were 
used as instrumental variables in the LIML estimations. Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and 
Yogo (2005) show that the estimates are likely to be biased if the instruments in a regression are only 
weakly correlated with the suspected endogenous variables. The LIML Fuller version of the 
instrumental variable methods is robust with weak instruments. Furthermore, as the sample size in 
this paper is only 45, it can be considered a small sample. LIML estimates are robust with small 
samples, and so the risk of a significantly large bias is minor. Data were obtained from the World 
Development Indicators.
10
 
 
4.  Results  
 
The estimation results for OLS are reported in Table 3. The results for the LIML estimation 
are exhibited in Table 4, while its first-stage results are in Table 5. In each table, the results using 
TRANS as a proxy for government transparency are shown in columns (1) and (4), whereas results 
using TRANS1 as proxies are in columns (2) and (5). In addition, results using TRANS2 as proxies 
                                                   
10 The data are available from HP of World Bank 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do (accessed 28 March 2011). 
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are shown in columns (3) and (6). Results excluding individual level variables as independent 
variables are presented in columns (1)–(3), while those including individual level variables are 
reported in columns (4)–(6) in each table. Information regarding individual level variables could not 
be obtained for some observations; thus, the sample size was reduced from 27,423 in columns 
(1)–(3) to 24,677 in columns (4)–(6). The subjects within the groups correlated because they share 
the same condition, which is analogous to the time invariant fixed effects in the panel data regression 
model. In this paper, it is reasonable to assume that the observations may be spatially correlated 
within a country, as the preference of one respondent may well relate to the preference of another in 
the same country. Furthermore, the standard errors of the coefficients may be biased downward 
(Moulton 1990). To control for this bias, robust standard errors were calculated by clustering on the 
country; z-values were then obtained using cluster–robust standard errors. 
First, I will discuss the results in Table 3. The results for TRANS, TRANS1, and TRANS2 
yielded positive signs and were statistically significant in all estimations. The absolute values for 
TRANS are 0.03 and 0.04, indicating that a 1-point increase in the government transparency index 
increased DVIEW by 0.03 or 0.04 points. It is surprising to observe that transparency of government 
results in people having a positive view of nuclear energy, even directly after the Fukushima 
accident although its effect is considered small. It follows from this that the influence of government 
transparency does not change according to whether individual level variables are incorporated. 
Results for TRANS1 and TRANS2 are similar to those of TRANS, showing that the effect of 
government transparency is robust when alternative indices are used. I interpret the results as 
implying that citizens’ views regarding nuclear energy were less likely to be influenced by the 
Fukushima accident with a more transparent government. Furthermore, the signs for the coefficients 
of VIEW(–1) are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns. The coefficient 
is –0.23 when individual level variables are excluded, and –0.24 when they are included. This 
indicates that the positive effect of VIEW(–1) is robust to alternative specifications. Most of the 
other control variables were not statistically significant and did not influence changes in views on 
nuclear energy.  
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Concerning individual level variables for the estimation in Table 3, the results are reported in 
Table A1 (see Appendix). Most of the variables are not statistically significant. In this study, I have 
chosen to focus on variables that did have a significant effect on the dependent variable. Table A1 
shows that the coefficient of Full-time job dummy has the positive sign and is statistically significant 
when the reference group is retired people. This implies that the full-time workers are more inclined 
than retired people to have positive views on nuclear energy even after the Fukushima accident. The 
sign of the coefficient of Male dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all 
columns, which means that males are more likely to be positive towards nuclear energy than females. 
It follows then that perceptions about risk differ between genders when a severe accident occurs. 
Thus, males are more likely to hold the same views even after a severe accident. 
With regard to the LIML estimation results shown in Table 4, results for the control variables 
are not reported although they are included as independent variables. An over-identification test was 
used to test for exogeneity in the instrumental variables. Test statistics were not significant in 
columns (1)–(6) and, therefore, do not reject the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are 
uncorrelated with the error term. This suggests that the instrumental variables are valid. Furthermore, 
an endogeneity test shows whether LIML is even necessary. Test statistics were not significant in 
columns (1)–(6) and do not reject the null hypothesis that NCLEAR is uncorrelated with the error 
term. Accordingly, the number of nuclear plants is not an endogenous independent variable when 
DVIEW is the dependent variable. This suggests that OLS is valid and so LIML is not necessary. 
However, to check the robustness of the OLS results, the LIML results are exhibited. In Table 5, the 
first-stage results show that the coefficients for Land area take the predicted positive sign only in 
column (1); however, none of the results are statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficients for 
Population density take the expected negative sign in all estimations and are statistically significant 
at the 1% level in all columns. The results for Population density as the instrumental variable are 
consistent with the prediction but Land area is not. In all columns in Table 4, TRANS, TRANS1, and 
TRANS2 yield a significant positive sign, which is similar to the results in Table 3. Furthermore, the 
signs for the coefficients of VIEW(–1) are negative and statistically significant in all columns, 
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suggesting that controlling for endogeneity bias does not affect the results of VIEW(–1). I 
interpreted this result to suggest that citizens who favor nuclear energy were more likely to be 
affected by the Fukushima accident and have stronger negative views then before the accident. 
Hence, views regarding nuclear energy tend to converge. All in all, the results in Table 4 are very 
similar to those in Table 3. The estimation results are considered to be robust. These results strongly 
support Hypothesis. 
The above evidence can be interpreted to indicate that citizens’ views were not influenced by 
the Fukushima incident in countries with more transparent governments. Thus, it can be argued that 
government transparency played a critical role in the formation of views regarding nuclear energy 
before the Fukushima incident. This is so because information regarding nuclear energy after the 
Fukushima incident did not change their views, which is consistent with previous research on 
political persuasion (e.g., Zaller 1992; Prior 2006; Enikolopov et al., 2009). 
 
5. Conclusions 
The Fukushima incident renewed the debate regarding the issue of nuclear energy. The views 
of citizens regarding nuclear energy are thus believed to have been influenced by the Fukushima 
incident because some countries, in addition to Japan, changed their energy policies as a 
consequence of the Fukushima incident. Government policy is considered to reflect people’s views 
and opinions, and as such it is worthwhile to investigate the reasons why views regarding nuclear 
energy changed worldwide after the Fukushima incident. This study used individual level data from 
45 countries, with a sample size of 27,423 observations, to examine how government transparency 
influenced changes in views regarding nuclear energy before and after the 2011 Japanese disasters. It 
was observed that in the majority of countries studied in this paper that the rate of favoring nuclear 
energy declined after the disaster. However, empirical results have shown that people were less 
likely to be affected by news of the Fukushima accident when governments more frequently updated 
data released to the public. This result is in line with the belief-based model of persuasion 
(DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010). 
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This finding clearly states that views regarding nuclear energy were less elastic to the news 
of the Fukushima incident in situations where people already held supportive views about nuclear 
energy as a result of information provided by their government before the incident. Thus, similar to 
belief-based models of persuasion (DellaVigna and Gentzkov, 2010), transparency of government 
enables people to have opinions on those matters that the government discloses sufficient 
information.  
The importance of transparency, however, appears to depend on the condition of the 
“information market”. The development and diffusion of cross-border media have created a 
competitive information market. Thus, people can obtain information about an incident even if a 
government attempts to conceal it (e.g., for the sake of nuclear energy industry). Consequently, 
people are less inclined to trust their government when the government does not disclose information. 
It follows then that the greater the level of government transparency, the greater the likelihood is that 
people will trust their government. In contrast, government transparency enables people to make 
optimal decisions because of an abundance of public information. That is, in the development 
process of cross-border media, the benefit from transparency increases for both citizens and 
governments. Such an inference has not been investigated in this paper. This remaining issue is to be 
addressed in future research. 
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Table 1  Change in views regarding nuclear energy  
(rate of favoring nuclear energy after a natural disaster) – (rate of favoring nuclear energy before a 
natural disaster) 
Country 
Difference 
   (1) 
Difference 
(sourced from 
the BBC) 
 
(2) 
Austria –4  
Azerbaijan 3  
Bangladesh –13  
Belgium –9  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
–3 
 
Brazil –2  
Bulgaria –6  
Cameroon –4  
Canada –8  
China –13  
Colombia –1  
Czech 
Republic 
–2 
 
Egypt –13  
Fiji 1  
Finland –6  
France –8 –10 
Georgia –9  
Germany –8 –15 
Greece –2  
Hong Kong –8  
Iceland –6  
India –9 –10 
Iraq –13  
Ireland –4  
Italy –4  
Japan –23 –15 
Kenya –11  
South Korea  –1  
Latvia –1  
Macedonia –2  
Morocco 19  
Netherlands –7  
Nigeria –2  
Pakistan –2  
Palestine –9  
Poland –6  
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Romania –10  
Russia –11 –3 
Saudi Arabia –9  
Serbia –4  
South Africa 4  
Spain 2  
Switzerland –6  
Tunisia –5  
Turkey –4  
United States –6 –1 
Vietnam –5  
 
Note: Serbia and Palestine are excluded in the regression estimation because independent variable 
data were not available.  
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Table 2  Definition of variables and their descriptive statistics 
 Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
 Country level characteristics 
 
  
TRANS 
 
Government transparency indicator: 1 (low)–6 (high) 5.1 1.0 
TRANS1 TRANS + foi 1
(1)
: 
1 (low)–7 (high) 
5.7 1.4 
TRANS2 
 
TRANS + foi 2
 (2)
 
1 (low)–11 (high) 
6.4 2.3 
EXPE 
 
Dummy for Russia and the United States; both 
experienced nuclear accidents (the Chernobyl and 
Three Mile Island accidents, respectively). 
0.06 --- 
CORRUP 
 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2009 4.85 2.30 
PROTE 
 
Protestant rate 0.13 0.22 
CATHO Catholic rate  
 
0.26 0.34 
LEGAL_EN 
 
Takes 1 if legal origin is England, otherwise 0   0.26 --- 
LEGAL_FR 
 
Takes 1 if legal origin is French, otherwise 0 0.31 --- 
NCLEAR 
 
Number of nuclear power plants in operation 7.7 19.1 
POP 
 
Population (millions) 101.5 251.1 
GDP 
 
GDP per capita (million dollars) 1.9 1.4 
GOVSIZ 
 
Government expenditure regarding GDP  0.16 0.08 
NDIS 
 
Total number of natural disasters since 1970 96.5 139.9 
EASIA Dummies for East Asian countries (Japan, China, and 
Korea). 
0.06 --- 
EUROP 
 
Dummies for European countries. 0.46 --- 
 Individual level characteristics. 
 
  
VIEW(0) 
 
Degree of respondent’s favoring of nuclear energy after 
earthquake: 1 (strongly oppose)–4 (strongly favor) 
2.56 1.06 
VIEW(–1) 
 
Degree of respondent’s favoring of nuclear energy 
before earthquake: 1 (strongly oppose)–4 (strongly 
favor) 
2.72 1.06 
DVIEW VIEW(0) – VIEW(–1) 
 
–0.15 0.74 
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Note:  
(1) foi 1 is 1 if the Freedom of Information Act has been in existence, otherwise 0.  
(2) foi 2 is 1 if the Freedom of Information Act has been in existence for more than five years; 
however, if it is equal to 10 years or less the foi 2 is 2, between 10 and 15 years it is 3, between 15 
and 20 years it is 4, and over 20 years it is 5. 
 
Source: VIEW(0), VIEW(–1), and DVIEW were obtained from WIN-Gallup International (2011). 
TRANS was sourced from Islam (2006) and NCLEAR from HP of European nuclear society 
(http://www.euronuclear.org/info/npp-ww.htm accessed on April 30, 2011). POP, GDP and 
GOVSIZ were obtained from Penn World Table 6.3. 
Age 
 
Respondent’s age 41.5 15.7 
Income 1 
dummy 
Low (Bottom quintile/20%):  
Question: Compared with other families in your 
country, how would you describe your household 
income? 
0.20 --- 
Income 2 
dummy 
Medium low (Second quintile/20%): 
Question: Compared with other families in your 
country, how would you describe your household 
income? 
0.22 --- 
Income 3 
dummy   
Medium (third quintile/20%) 
Question: Compared with other families in your 
country, how would you describe your household 
income? 
0.22 --- 
Income 4 
dummy 
Medium high (fourth quintile/20%) 
Question: Compared with other families in your 
country, how would you describe your household 
income? 
0.14 --- 
Income 5 
dummy 
High (top quintile/20%) 
Question: Compared with other families in your 
country, how would you describe your household 
income? 
0.14 --- 
Education 1 
dummy 
Respondent’s education level is no education or only 
basic education 
0.25 --- 
Education 2 
dummy 
Respondent’s education level is secondary school 0.43 --- 
Education 3 
dummy 
Respondent’s education level is a high level of 
education (e.g., university) 
0.32 --- 
Retired 
dummy 
Respondent is retired 0.15 --- 
Full-time job  
dummy 
Respondent has a full-time job 0.54 --- 
Unemployed 
dummy 
Respondent is unemployed 0.09 --- 
Student or housewife 
dummy 
Respondent is a housewife or student 0.22 --- 
Female dummy 
 
Respondent is male 0.49 --- 
Male dummy 
 
Respondent is female 0.51 --- 
Rural resident 
dummy 
Respondent resides in a rural area 0.28 --- 
Urban resident 
dummy 
Respondent resides in an urban area 0.72 --- 
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(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php. accessed at April 30, 2011). NDIS was 
obtained from the International Disaster Database (http://www.emdat.be. accessed on April 30, 
2011). CORR was sourced from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
(accessed on April 28, 2011). PROTE, CATHO, and LEGAL were sourced from La Porta et al. 
(1999), http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset (accessed on April 30, 2011). 
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Table 3  OLS estimation  
Dependent variable: DVIEW (the difference in views regarding nuclear energy)  
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors obtained 
clustered at the country. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
TRANS 
 
0.03** 
(2.31) 
  0.04** 
(2.16) 
  
TRANS1 
 
 0.05*** 
(3.55) 
  0.04*** 
(3.18) 
 
TRANS2 
 
  0.02** 
(2.47) 
  0.02** 
(2.42) 
VIEW(–1) 
 
–0.23*** 
(–11.2) 
–0.23*** 
(–11.4) 
–0.23*** 
(–11.3) 
–0.24*** 
(–11.1) 
–0.24*** 
(–11.3) 
–0.24*** 
(–11.2) 
EXPE 
 
–0.10 
(–1.67) 
–0.12* 
(–1.93) 
–0.08 
(–1.38) 
–0.10 
(–1.64) 
–0.12* 
(–1.90) 
–0.09 
(–1.45) 
CORRUPT –0.003 
(–0.18) 
–0.001 
(–0.10) 
–0.002 
(–0.12) 
–0.004 
(–0.24) 
–0.001 
(–0.08) 
–0.0007 
(–0.04) 
PROTE 
 
0.11 
(1.07) 
0.09 
(0.97) 
0.05 
(0.57) 
0.14 
(1.26) 
0.12 
(1.18) 
0.08 
(0.80) 
CATHO 
 
–0.07 
(–0.97) 
–0.09 
(–1.08) 
–0.09 
(–1.05) 
–0.07 
(–0.91) 
–0.08 
(–1.03) 
–0.09 
(–1.05) 
LEGAL_EN 
 
0.04 
(0.71) 
0.03 
(0.49) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
0.03 
(0.50) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
–0.005 
(–0.09) 
LEGAL_FR 
 
0.04 
(0.86) 
0.04 
(0.84) 
0.009 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.75) 
0.03 
(0.73) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
NCLEAR 
 
0.001 
(0.91) 
0.002 
(0.27) 
–0.003 
(–0.32) 
0.001 
(1.00) 
0.0005 
(0.44) 
–0.0001 
(–0.14) 
Ln (POP) 
 
0.02 
(1.19) 
0.02 
(1.67) 
0.03* 
(1.94) 
0.02 
(1.33) 
0.02* 
(1.73) 
0.03* 
(2.06) 
GDP 
 
–0.04*10
4 
(–1.44) 
–0.05*10
4 
(–1.64) 
–0.04*10
4 
(–1.41) 
–0.04*10
4 
(–1.37) 
–0.05*10
4 
(–1.57) 
–0.04*10
4 
(–1.41) 
GOVSIZ 
 
–0.12 
(–0.48) 
–0.20 
(–0.86) 
–0.22 
(–0.91) 
–0.11 
(–0.43) 
–0.19 
(–0.82) 
–0.21 
(–0.86) 
EASIA 
 
–0.06 
(–0.65) 
–0.10 
(–1.04) 
–0.08 
(–0.93) 
–0.05 
(–0.56) 
–0.09 
(–0.91) 
–0.07 
(–0.87) 
EUROP 
 
0.02 
(0.50) 
0.003 
(0.09) 
 0.01 
(0.30) 
 0.03 
(0.76) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
0.02 
(0.47) 
NDIS 
 
–0.22*10
3 
(–1.18) 
–0.17*10
3 
(–.95) 
–0.19*10
3 
(–1.25) 
–0.24*10
3 
(–1.29) 
–0.20*10
3 
(–1.05) 
–0.23*10
3 
(–1.38) 
Constant 
 
–1.10*** 
(–5.17) 
–1.16*** 
(–5.68) 
–1.09*** 
(–5.18) 
–1.16*** 
(-5.13) 
–1.21*** 
(–5.46) 
–1.15*** 
(–5.13) 
Adjusted R
2 
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Individual 
characteristics. 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,423 27,423 27,423 24,677 24,677 24,677 
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Table 4  LIML estimation 
Dependent variable: DVIEW(the difference in views regarding nuclear energy)  
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by robust standard errors obtained 
clustered at the country. ** and *** denote significance at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
Instrumental variables are population density and land area. All independent variables of the OLS 
estimation are included although the results are not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
TRANS 
 
0.04** 
(2.44) 
  0.04** 
(2.28) 
  
TRANS1 
 
 0.04*** 
(3.64) 
  0.04*** 
(3.19) 
 
TRANS2 
 
  0.02** 
(2.33) 
  0.02** 
(1.99) 
VIEW(–1) 
 
–0.23*** 
(–11.3) 
–0.24*** 
(–11.5) 
–0.24*** 
(–11.4) 
–0.24*** 
(–10.7) 
–0.24*** 
(–10.9) 
–0.24*** 
(–10.9) 
NCLEAR 
 
0.0006 
(0.36) 
0.001 
(0.60) 
0.0002 
(0.14) 
–0.0004 
(–0.19) 
0.0007 
(0.36) 
0.0005 
(0.25) 
Over- 
identification  
test 
0.12 
P-value 
= 0.72 
0.06 
P-value 
= 0.80 
0.02 
P-value 
= 0.88 
0.15 
P-value 
= 0.69 
0.89 
P-value 
= 0.34 
1.26 
P-value 
= 0.26 
Endogeneity 
test  
0.01 
P-value 
= 0.89 
0.10 
P-value 
= 0.74 
0.05 
P-value 
= 0.81 
0.54 
P-value 
= 0.45 
0.13 
P-value 
= 0.71 
0.02 
P-value 
= 0.86 
Individual 
characteristics. 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Centered R
2 
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Observations 27,423 27,423 27,423 24,677 24,677 24,677 
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Table 5  LIML estimation (First Stage) 
Dependent variable: NCLEAR (Number of nuclear plants)  
 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by robust standard errors obtained 
clustered at the country. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Instrumental variables are 
population density and land area. All independent variables of the OLS estimation are included 
although the results are not reported. 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Land area 
 
0.09*10
-6 
(0.13) 
–0.34*10
-6 
(–0.47) 
–0.64*10
-6 
(–0.90) 
–0.04*10
-6 
(–0.06) 
–0.43*10
-6 
(–0.58) 
–0.71*10
-6 
(–0.96) 
Population  
density 
–5.66*** 
(–2.85) 
–6.25*** 
(–3.16) 
–5.73*** 
(–3.35) 
–6.38*** 
(–2.77) 
–6.90*** 
(–3.08) 
–6.27*** 
(–3.11) 
F-test  F = 2.74 
P-value 
= 0.00 
F = 3.16 
P-value 
= 0.00 
F = 3.45 
P-value 
= 0.00 
F = 2.60 
P-value 
= 0.02 
F = 4.36 
P-value 
= 0.00 
F = 14.8 
P-value 
= 0.00 
F-test of 
excluded 
instruments 
F = 5.20 
P-value 
= 0.00 
F = 6.24 
P-value 
= 0.00 
F = 5.80 
P-value 
= 0.00 
F = 4.53 
P-value 
= 0.01 
F = 5.32 
P-value 
= 0.01 
F = 4.83 
P-value 
= 0.01 
Individual 
characteristics. 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,423 27,423 27,423 24,677 24,677 24,677 
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Appendix 
Table A1 (results of individual level variables from Table 5 ) 
Dependent variable: NCLEAR (number of nuclear plants)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors obtained 
clustered at the country. * and *** denote significance at the 10 and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (4)  
Table 3 
  (5)  
 Table 3 
  (6)  
 Table 3 
Age 
 
–0.0008 
(–1.60) 
–0.0009* 
(–1.73) 
–0.0009* 
(–1.69) 
Income 1 
dummy 
       <reference group>  
Income 2 
dummy 
–0.03* 
(–1.89) 
–0.03* 
(–1.83) 
–0.04* 
(–2.06) 
Income 3 
dummy   
–0.04 
(–1.58) 
–0.04 
(–1.62) 
–0.05* 
(–1.88) 
Income 4 
dummy 
–0.02 
(–0.94) 
–0.02 
(–0.88) 
–0.03 
(–1.16) 
Income 5 
dummy 
–0.02 
(–0.80) 
–0.01 
(–0.73) 
–0.02 
(–1.19) 
Education 1 
dummy 
<reference group>  
Education 2 
dummy 
–0.02 
(–1.23) 
–0.02 
(–1.33) 
–0.01 
(–1.05) 
Education 3 
dummy 
–0.01 
(–0.76) 
–0.01 
(–1.07) 
–0.01 
(–1.00) 
Retired 
dummy 
<reference group>  
Full-time job  
dummy 
0.05* 
(1.92) 
0.04* 
(1.83) 
0.05* 
(2.12) 
Unemployed 
dummy 
0.01 
(0.58) 
0.01 
(0.45) 
0.01 
(0.54) 
Student or house 
wife dummy 
0.03 
(1.02) 
0.03 
(1.02) 
0.03 
(1.14) 
Female dummy 
 
<reference group>  
Male dummy 
 
0.07*** 
(5.44) 
0.07*** 
(5.50) 
0.07*** 
(5.48) 
Rural resident 
dummy 
<reference group>  
Urban resident 
dummy 
0.01 
(0.65) 
0.01 
(0.74) 
0.01 
(0.83) 
Observations 24,677 24,677 24,677 
